INFORMATION BELOW WAS SUBMITTED BY:
Michael Cox
Former Medic
2nd Plt. C Co.
3/187 101st Airborne;

Narrative of LT Robert Coale, Platoon Leader, 2d Platoon, C Company, 3d Battalion (Airborne) 187th Infantry. A summary of actions of 5 March 1968:;

Frederick Johnson, 2d Platoon, C Company, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 187th Infantry, Operations at Song Be, 5 March 1968:;

Narrative of Captain Jon Williams, Company Commander, C Company, 3d Battalion (Airborne) 187th Infantry:;

*A special thanks to them for the information and to James Bond giving permission to use this information.

Added note from James Bond

I was not commanding C Co on the 5th of March, Jon Williams was. I had commander C Co from November 1966 to the end of December of 1967. At that time my battalion commander moved me to a staff position as S-3 Air. Jon Williams then took command of C Co and did so until mid March 68 when he was replaced by a Cpt Halliday.  He left the company at the end of July and I returned to command of C Co until my departure from Vietnam at the end of November 1968.

It is a common practice in the Army during combat operations to put company's, battalion's and brigades under the operational control of other units. This was the case with C Co on the 5th of March 1968
when they were under the operational control of 1st Battalion 506th Infantry a battalion in our brigade.

I should also note the the material I'm sending you is a segment of a book which I will be getting a copy-right on and which I'll be
publishing in the not too distant future.
Sincerely, James E. Bond



Narrative of March 5, 1968
07-21-2003

James Bond

As the 2nd Plt. Medic, dealing hands on with the wounded, certain incidents, try as I might, I cannot forget.  You will find that I have been quite detailed so again feel free to edit whatever you find not relevant.  I have also sent back the maps and a copy of the daily journal with some notations you may find helpful.

       Sincerely,
       Mike Cox

  Note:  Please don’t mistake my going forward to help Larson and Burnett as bravery (I was scared to death).  Only an inexperienced medic would do what I did without covering fire.  A dead or wounded medic is a burden, not a help and perhaps Mike Langer would be alive today.  He lost his life attempting to help me get Burnett.  The intense part of the firefight probably lasted no more than 20-25 minutes.  Waiting a few minutes to get covering fire could have saved a life, Langers!

Song Be, Republic of Vietnam
03-05-1969

  I had not seen a Co. leave the firebase that morning so I was surprised when a firefight broke out only 7 or 8 hundred meters S.W. of the firebase.  Shortly after, we were informed by the platoon Sgt., S. Sgt. Elliot that A Co. had been ambushed and that our platoon was being sent to assist them.  Since A Company was pinned down just outside the village, a mounted quad 50 would be going with us.  I was to the rear of the platoon as we moved down the road into the village.  As we made our way on the road going S.E. out of the village, one of the men in our platoon sustained a gunshot wound to the hand (I don’t remember his name).  I heard the quad 50 open up on the road ahead, and then it stopped.  As we got closer, we were told the quad 50 had gone ahead of the platoon and was knocked out by an R.P.G. round.
  As we joined the rest of the platoon, which was spread out across an open area just S.E. of the village, we could see S. Sgt. Elliot moving from position to position directing fire into a bamboo thicket approximately 50-60 meters ahead of us.  Elliot saw me and pointed to the left flank hollering that we had wounded over there.  I moved in that direction and saw Dave Bidart lying wounded in an open area maybe 10 meters in front of our L. flank position.  When I got to him, I dressed a wound to his upper right leg.  Dave was conscious and talking to me. he was wounded while attacking enemy positions with Larson and Burnett and had gotten back this far on his own.  M. Langer crawled up and helped Dave back to safety.  I dropped into an old foxhole to get out of the line of fire when I hear Elliot holler for me again and he pointed towards the bamboo thicket, about 15 meters from me.  I could see Larson and Burnett, though I didn’t know who it was until I reached them.  Larson was face down with Burnett lying on top of him.  Larsen was dead and Sgt. Burnett was alive, though he had a very critical head wound.  Apparently Gary was trying to help Larson when he himself was wounded.  I put dressing on Sgt. Burnett’s head wound and then looked for help.  It was chaos, heavy firing!  There was no one at all to my felt and to my right, the platoon was moving up towards the thicket but they were not yet close enough for help.  There was one dead N.V.A. soldier in a spider hole 4 or 5 feet to my left, and two more dead N.V.A. a few feet in front of me side by side in spider holes, obviously all killed by Larson and Burnett.  Mike Langer showed up again crawling up next to me asking if he could help.  As we grabbed Burnett’s shoulder straps, Langer was hit as well as Burnett getting hit for at least the 2nd time.  Burnett was hit this time in the lower right chest area.  Leaned over him, Gary was still breathing.  Langer was hit in the inner thigh area on the inside of his right leg.  I asked Mike if he could crawl back on his own,he said yes and started out.  I never saw him alive again and I don’t know if he was hit again or what.  By the time I got back to where the Medevacs were taking off (maybe 15 min.), he was already gone.  By this time, the platoon was moving past me on my right and two of our guys crawled over and dragged Sgt. Burnett back.  Things began to die down as the remaining N.V.A., had jumped from their spider holes and ran; A Co. apparently had moved up behind us and was medevacing our wounded as well as theirs.
Side Notes

I was told Dave Bidart was smoking a cigarette when he was medevaced so I was stunned that night when informed he had died.  Langer was also dead, Larson dead, and Sgt. Burnett died the next day.

I dressed one N.V.A. prisoners arm wound and a major from the 506th came by chopper to get him.

Later that afternoon, our platoon made a sweep S.E. along the road and found one dead Vietnamese man in a bunker built below hooch-it was unknown how he died, killed by N.V.A. crossfire or what?

Finally, I believe our guys counted 57 spider holes and being that our unit was caught in the open, the decision to attack must have surprised this N.V.A. unit.  It probably also saved a lot of our lives.  I believe Larson, Burnett and Bidart got the 1st line of spider holes so fast that the N.V.A. began to panic.  Their courage and sacrifice gave the rest of us a much better chance to live.


Michael Cox
Former Medic
2nd Plt. C Co.
3/187 101st Airborne

Battle of Song Be, 5 March 1968
Narrative of Captain Jon Williams, Company Commander, C Company, 3d Battalion (Airborne) 187th Infantry:

”On 5 March 1968, I was the company commander of C Company 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division on combat operations near the village of Song Be (YU 115064), Republic of Vietnam. My company was OPCON to the 1st Battalion 506th Infantry (LTC  Enzo F. Klinner commanding), a sister battalion in the 3d Brigade. We  had been having contact off and on with VC and NVA units from the beginning of this operation. On 5 March, my orders were to continue to conduct search and destroy operations. By mid to late morning the battalion had made significant contact with enemy forces. A Company 1st  Battalion 506th Infantry had been in the heaviest fighting much of the  day and was in need of reinforcement. I was directed to attach a platoon to them. I did this and sent 2d platoon, under the command of LT Robert Coale.

When LT Coale’s platoon returned to my operational control, he gave me a summary of the day’s operations and informed me of the actions of those men who had been killed. Our brigade commander, Colonel Lawrence Mowery, had also been briefed on these actions and directed LT Coale to insure that a summary be placed in the operations journal of our parent battalion, 3d Battalion (Airborne) 187th Infantry. Colonel Mowery also stated that these men should be put in for certain valorous awards for these actions. Not long after this action, I was hospitalized and command of the company was given to Captain Robert Halliday. It appears that no one followed through on the paper work on the award and no presentation was ever made. I believe this to have been a gross injustice to the memory of these men who on this day did many acts of valor and should have been so recognized.”
Narrative of LT Robert Coale, Platoon Leader, 2d Platoon, C Company, 3d Battalion (Airborne) 187th Infantry. A summary of actions of 5 March 1968:

”The following is my attempt to recollect the events of one platoon on one day during our year in RVN. It has been very hard on me to get it on paper. I guess you could say its taken 35 years to get done. I don’t want you to think that I think this day is different or special. There were many fights we were in as a company that were just as ferocious and deadly as this one, fights in which all of C company  acquitted themselves just as honorably and heroically as I’ve tried to  depict for the 2nd platoon. This just happens to have been my first one, and I needed to get it off my chest. I wish I could remember all the names of the troopers with 2nd platoon on that day. I wish I could recount all the countless acts of heroism that happened that day. I guess that’s why they call it “the fog of war.” I want to say to the veterans still alive and to the survivors of those who aren’t, how proud I am to have had the privilege to serve with you and yours. That day you went above and beyond. It was not a defensive battle where soldiers fight to save their lives and their buddies’ lives. This was an offensive battle where a man has to dig down in himself to find the courage to stand up and take the fight to the enemy. You did that with so much courage, so much tenacity, and with such professionalism it makes me swell with pride to this day.

Your heroism that day should have been rewarded. I know it wasn’t. With your help we may be able to get some recognition for a few, but for most of you it will just be this letter. Save this letter and show your wives, children, and grandchildren. They deserve to know. You deserve the recognition.

C Company, 3d Battalion (Airborne) 187 Infantry was on the perimeter of an FSB in a place called Song Be. The morning was non-descript – non-eventful until around 8:30. I was taking a whore’s bath out of a helmet, standing on top of a bunker in all my nakedness when all hell broke loose about 1000 –1200 meters away. I could tell it was bad, by listening. The rifle fire was going both ways—toward each other. The thump/crack went both ways. I knew there were two big units exchanging fire and people were getting hurt and killed on both sides.  Colonel Mowery (our brigade commander) called CPT Williams and told him that A/1/506 was in trouble and he wanted one rifle platoon with an officer as platoon leader. A/1/506 was sweeping toward the village and had run into a dug-in NVA regiment. LT Craig Caldwell (the only other platoon leader officer) was on R&R so that only left me. I’ve often thought Colonel Mowery wanted a young officer, because a seasoned, experienced NCO platoon leader might have second thoughts about doing what he was going to order us to do.


CPT Williams argued with COL Mowery, trying to convince him to send the whole company, but the Colonel was adamant. One platoon only. We saddled up, LBE only, and left at a quick march/double time. I don’t remember the directions but we went about 600-800 meters down one road then turned left up another road 200-400 meters toward the village. It was at this junction that Joe Valdez was shot in the hand. I told him to go back to the firebase but he said he was all right and continued on with us. At about 75-100 meters short of A/1/506, the COL had us hold up. We were hunkered down in the ditches by the road. I don’t remember a quad 50 caliber MG being with us, but there was one that had been disabled by a rocket propelled grenade ahead and on the right side of the road. The Colonel wanted one squad to go secure it. He was worried the NVA would get to it. If they had, we would be in even deeper shit than we were. SSG Digesualdo was the senior and most experienced squad leader, so I sent his squad to get the Quad 50. COL Mowery told me to go coordinate with A/1/506 CO, so my RTO and I (SP4 Stephen P. Wiggens, I think) made a mad dash up to A company CO. The NVA saw us coming and tried very hard to kill us. I remember going in front of a small out-building, which seemed to explode with all the AK fire hitting it. How we made that run without getting hit I’ll never understand, but we did. The RTOs radio took a round in the battery pack, but still worked. A CO commander wanted us to move up on line at his right flank on the left side of the road. 

At this point A CO was in somewhat of a line, pinned down, about 75 meters in front of a large bamboo thicket, which was full of NVA in 2-man spider holes. I couldn’t tell for sure, but I estimated A/1/506 had between 20-40 KIA/WIA on the ground around us. We were told later that the enemy was an element of an elite NVA regiment. I don’t remember the unit number but they were a tough, brave and disciplined outfit. They earned my respect that day. I asked A CO commander for covering fire before running that gauntlet back to 2nd and 3rd squads and SSG Elliot. SGT Gary Burnett had one of the squads and SGT George Clark had the other. There were no questions when I told them what we were going to do, just “Yes sir, let’s do it.” SGT George Clark told me recently that Gary Burnett told him that he thought, “This is going to be a bad one.”

I called A CO commander and asked for as much covering fire as he could muster and with SSG Elliott and our RTOs, and 2nd and 3rd squads made the first assault I went with Burnett’s squad on the left, and Elliott went with Clark on the right. The sequence of events and time line become very hazy at this point, but it seems that A/1/506 departed rather rapidly. I’m sure COL Mowery ordered them out and in hindsight I totally agree with his decision. With that many KIA/WIA it would have been impossible to reorganize effectively. We were on our own, facing a dug-in enemy force that was at least equal in size, probably larger, and we were on line in a plowed field with no cover and no concealment.  SSG Elliott was screaming at me to get fire support, but I was on the radio with COL Mowery and he was coordinating the fire and air and me. All air and artillery were going behind our enemy’s front line, trying to keep the enemy from escaping. Basically out in that field with us, it came down to rifle on rifle.

SGT Fred Larsen was an acting Sergeant (responsibility, no pay) and a team leader in Burnett’s squad. No one ordered SGT Larsen to charge that spider hole to his front. He did that on his own initiative. He got a grenade in the hole but was shot, and fell about 5 feet in front of the enemy line. Both NVA were dead, but so was SGT Larsen. SSG Elliott yelled to SGT Burnett and pointed out two spider holes in front of his position and a third in front of himself. On a count of three, we laid down heavy covering fire while Elliott, Burnett and SP4 Bidart made the 2nd grenade charge. SSG Elliott looked like a major league runner stealing second base. He went in fast and low, started his slide from about 10 feet out, rolled that grenade under-handed over his toes right in the hole and was fast low crawling back to us before the grenade went off. Burnett and Bidart weren’t as lucky and both got hit. Burnett fell close to Larsen, and crawled over to give him cover. Our medic, SP4 Mike Cox, arrived about now. As he was getting to Larsen/Burnett, Mike Langer was getting Davey Bidart pulled back. The rest of us were moving up, fire and maneuver, 2 or 3 or 4 at a time. It was a picture of excellence watching the men move. Every one was screaming at each other over the din of the fire to coordinate who was maneuvering and who was firing. As I went past Bidart (or Langer, not sure which) he was leaning on an elbow in shock but awake. The whole top left quarter of his cranium was shot away. He asked for a smoke and I laid him in my lap while I lit one for him. He asked me if he was going to die and I told him that if he was well enough to ask for a smoke, he’d make it.

SSG Elliott pulled up beside me and ‘politely’ reminded me I had more important things to do and to get back in the game. We still were not into the bamboo. Everyone was running low on ammo and I had been asking COL Mowery for resupply for quite a while. He basically said we weren’t getting any. Some quartermaster type SSG up in the ammo dump was listening on his 2 1/2 ton truck radio and took it upon himself to bring us 5.56 ammo. He drove up the road to somewhere behind us and crawled behind us passing out bandoleers. He was an unknown hero. We needed that ammo. The fire and maneuver continued up to the bamboo. As we breached their first line of spider holes we tried to use them for cover. However, they were full of hot bamboo coals and no one stayed in very long. However, this last assault is what broke their back and they were running for their lives.

The enemy regiment had pulled out, and the air and artillery was pounding them about a half a click away. We were close to Cambodia and that’s where they were headed. We were ordered to regroup at the road, and then spread out on line and police the battlefield. There were some bodies left and lots of ammo and weapons, field gear, uniforms, etc. We only policed about 200 meters past our battle area; then fell back to the road where we started. The 2 1/2 ton truck that had brought our ammo was there with Larsen in the back. I never found out who the SSG was who brought our ammo. I hope he received some recognition from his own outfit. As we fell out in the ditches, the shock started hitting us; our legs and hands started shaking and a thirst came on that I’d never experienced, even in football 2-a-day practice drills. Someone threw me a full canteen and I drank it straight down and was still too dry to talk. SSG Elliott and I were ordered to a debriefing down the road with COL Mowery, 1/506 CO, and several others. The 1/506 CO told us that the 2nd platoon performed more heroically than any unit that he had seen in his entire career. He said our actions saved a lot of A/1/506 lives. He saluted us then shook our hands. There were tears in his eyes. COL Mowery told Elliott and me we would both be getting Silver Stars (we didn’t). There was a lot of hand shaking and backslapping and we all walked back up the road so the entourage could congratulate second platoon men individually. COL Mowery told me to write an after action report and to include names of those I wanted to get medals for valor.  As quickly as it started, it was over. The brass was on helicopters and gone, leaving us sitting on that road. Four and a half hours after it started, what was left of 2nd platoon (19 or 20 men) saddled up and started that long march back home to Charlie Company. Things were very quiet in the company area that night.”







LT Coale’s Notes: 
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